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Abstract: Microgrids play an important role in today’s power systems as the distributed generation
is becoming increasingly common. They can operate in two possible modes: (i) standalone and
(ii) grid-connected. The transitional state from standalone to grid-connected mode is very critical and
requires the microgrid to be synchronized with the main grid. Thus, secure, reliable and trustworthy
control and communication is utmost necessary to prevent out-of-sync connection which could
severely damage the microgrid and/or the main grid. Existing solutions consume more resources
and take long time to establish a secure connection. The objective of the proposed work is to reduce
the connection establishment time by using efficient computational algorithms and save the resources.
This paper proposes a secure authentication and key establishment mechanism for ensuring safe
operation and control of the microgrids. The proposed approach uses the concept of Elgamal with
slight modification. Private key of the sender is used instead of a random number. The proposed
modification ensures the non repudiation. This paper also presents a system threat model along with
security network architecture and evaluates the performance of proposed algorithm in protecting
microgrid communication against man in the middle attacks and replay attacks that could delay
the packets to damage the system and need to be detected. Mathematical modeling and simulation
results show that the proposed algorithm performs better than the existing protocols in terms of
connection establishment, resource consumption and security level.
Keywords: secure communication; microgrid; security
1. Introduction
The microgrid is one of the most feasible approaches to provide electricity and power to small
location (e.g., homes, healthcare centers, armed forces bases, etc.) and also helps to integrate wind
and solar energy generation systems into the main grid [1–3]. Key components of a microgrid include
(1) connection from and to the main power grid (2) electrical loads and (3) a mean of backup energy
source (e.g., renewable resources, etc.). However, the basic requirement for a microgrid is its capability
to operate in both standalone mode and grid connected mode. In standalone mode, it usually provides
voltage and frequency stability to meet the required local power demand and reduces the risk of
blackout or disturbance during its transition phase from one mode to another. Microgrids also have
the capabilities to resynchronize themselves while connecting to the main grid to avoid any disruption
of power to sensitive loads.
For proper functioning of a microgrid, communication among its different components and
communication with the main grid must be secure and reliable. The targeted communication is the
microgrid control systems supported communication. To do so, control system can be divided into
hierarchical layers, i.e., (1) primary (2) secondary and (3) tertiary layers [4–6]. The responsibility of
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the primary control layer is to stabilize voltage and frequency during the transition period of the
microgrid while to compensate any frequency or voltage deviation during the primary control layer
is the responsibility of secondary control layer. Tertiary control layer is responsible for power flow
management between the main grid and microgrid along with the coordination with other microgrids.
Each control layer consists of multiple different physical equipment having different
computational resources. From the implementation point of view, each controller of the top layer in
hierarchy takes input from the layer below it and generates parameters which are provided back to the
lower layer controllers to perform appropriate control actions. This process of-course consumes time
and different controllers working at different layers have their own timing constraints. Therefore an
efficient communication algorithm needs to be developed to compensate unwanted communication
delays between the layers and within a layer. Moreover, the security architecture must be capable to
support various communication patterns (i.e., broadcast, multicast and unicast). Author [7] presented
an Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) based security algorithm to cope with these timing constrains.
RSA-based approaches are normally very expensive in term of computational time and resources
consumption. The reasons behind the RSA computational cost are (1) large key length ranges between
1024–4096 bits and (2) expensive power and multiplication operations.
This paper proposes a secure communication architecture for microgrid control system that
is based on Elgamal approach [8] and all the mathematical operations involved are addition and
subtraction that are less computationally expensive as compared to the RSA operations. Also in the
Elgamal approach, sender uses the public key of receiver and a random number to encrypt the message.
However, this simple approach is prone to the man in the middle attack. We modified this simple
approach by using the private key of sender to encrypt the message instead of a random number.
As the computation involves the discrete logrithmic problem over a cyclic group, it does not reveal the
sender private key. In addition, the receiver can verify and prove in future that the message was sent
by the actual sender. In this way the non repudiation properties is achieved. Key features of the paper
include (1) authentication of various devices used in microgrid control system, (2) development of
secure communication algorithm that support real time communication among various components
including resource constrained devices, (3) support various communication variants (i.e., multicast,
broadcast and unicast) and (4) data confidentiality and data authentication.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A literature survey is provided in Section 2 while an
overview of microgrids and their challenges is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 provides the details of
adopted system model, attack scenarios and data communication. The proposed security algorithm is
discussed in Section 5. The performance evaluation of the proposed algorithm is presented in Section 6.
Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
Main Contributions
The key contributions of the proposed algorithm are:
• develop a secure communication architecture at low cost in terms of time and packet size,
• secure the network communication against well know attacks,
• reduce the energy consumption by controlling the packet size and reducing the
communication overhead.
The proposed algorithm is compared theoretically and through simulations with other existing
algorithms discussed in this paper. A results comparison shows that the proposed solution performs
better than the existing algorithms in terms of computation resources, memory (storage) consumption
and security level.
2. Literature
A detailed literature survey on cyber security was conducted in [9] considering the smart
grid scenario. Here, we are highlighting only the relevant portion of this survey. IEC 62351 have
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addressed many real time critical security features in smart grid communication. For example, data
authentication and integrity is normally provided using digital signature, hashing function and access
control mechanisms. Intrusion detection system is used to monitor any malicious activity within the
network. To generate a digital signature, a hash of a message is created using one of the hashing
algorithm (SHA, MD5, etc.). The generated hash is encrypted with the private key of the sender
using RSA. This encrypted hash works as a digital signature. This is because, it can only be decrypted
by the sender’s public key. When a receiver receives a message, it separates encrypted hash from
the actual message. The message is given to same hashing function at receiver side to generate a
new hash. The receiver decrypts the received hash using the public key of sender. The receiver
compares the new generated hash with the decrypted hash. If both are same, the receiver accepts the
message as an authentic message. This approach is time consuming and has low acceptance rate at
industry level. A low-latency, high-integrity security retrofit for legacy Supervisory Control And Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems is presented in [10]. In this paper, a bump in the wire approach is used to
provide the security for serial communication among the devices in SCADA network (ad hoc network)
using HMAC and AES. As AES is symmetric key approach and works on the shared key concepts,
compromising one device can reveal the secret key and compromise the all the communication in
network. Also this approach is feasible for ad hoc network where all the devices reside within a
network and only the operator communicate with the devices locally or remotely. However, in case of
microgrid approach where the devices of microgrid communicate with main grid and can be controlled
locally or remotely, symmetric key approach is more prone to the key cmpromission attacks.
Recent researches [11,12] have proposed different security approaches for time constrained
applications that are based on (1) RSA (2) message authentication code (MAC) and (3) using one
time signature (OTS). MAC schemes are based on single common key between sender and receiver.
For example, Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) [11] is one of the famous
MAC scheme that divides time into slot to provide a timed efficient stream loss-tolerant authentication.
The sender usually signs messages using different keys for different time intervals. Once the key is
expired, sender make it public. Hence all the receivers who have buffered the received messages
from sender can now verify the authenticity of messages using this public key. Meanwhile, sender
uses another new key for MAC. This approach help multiple receivers to verify a single message
using only one key. However, memory requirement of this approach is high as each receiver needs
to buffer all the received messages until they are not verified. This approach is not suitable for real
time communication in microgrid scenario. To overcome this drawback, sender shares a key with each
individual receiver and then signs the MAC using this shared key for each receiver. Receiver uses the
same common key to verify the MAC. However, this approach has a high communication overhead as
each message carries n MACs for n receivers.
One time signature schemes [12] tried to solve the issue of replay attacks. One approach [13]
uses the precomputed hash chain to verify and authenticate data. In this approach, a mapping is
first created between the data and precomputed hashes. However this approach suffers from large
precomputation overhead and memory cost.
Recent researches focus on the smart grid security and very little attention is given to microgrid
security. A survey on the microgrid architecture, protocols and possible security threats is conducted
in [14]. This survey mainly focused on grouping together the microgrid equipments of the same
functionality. However communication security in terms of authentication and secure channel
establishment among different control elements is not discussed. A novel locality algorithm and
peer-to-peer communication infrastructure for optimizing network performance in smart microgrids is
proposed in [15] but it did not focus on the security aspects of mircogrid communication. This paper
proposes an efficient authentication and secure channel establishment procedure based on the Elgamal
elliptic curve concept.
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3. Overview of Microgrid System
A medium voltage DC microgrid was proposed by [16,17] to supply electrical energy to offshore
companies. Its objective was to supply power to run large motors, pumping and drilling of surfaces
along with other equipment (e.g., lighting, heating, cooling, etc.). Figure 1 shows the architecture of
a microgrid power system. 5 MW wind turbines are used to produce AC current that is fed as the
main electricity source while diesel electric generators are used for backup supply at each individual
platform. The generated AC power from wind turbines is converted into DC electric power using
a three level clamped rectifier that generate DC bus voltage of 5 KV. DC/DC converters are used
to establish an interface between a DC bus and offshore production platform. The purpose of the
controller is to transform DC voltages in the system and provide paths for power flow. The main
load on this platform is the load of induction motors that are used to run drilling machines and other
equipment. These loads are usually in megawatts and are considered as constant loads.
Both machine current and its flux are controlled by primary controller using dq-axis control.
Secondary controller controls the supply to DC/DC converters. These controllers take inputs from the
primary controllers. The details of the control algorithms are given in [16].
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Figure 1. Offshore production platform with offshore wind power generation.
In general, offshore platforms are powered by wind turbines that makes a interconnected
microgrid system. Figure 2 shows the control and communication architecture of the system [17].
For the purpose of power protection and regulation, a number of logical communication channels with
the communication architecture are developed inside the microgrid. For example, from primary
controller to the secondary controller and from secondary controller to the DC/DC converters,
backup generator, voltage regulator, and breakers. Secondary controller usually provides and receives
information from tertiary controller regarding power flow in and out of the microgrid. So tertiary
controller of one microgrid communicates with the tertiary controllers of other microgrid as shown
in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Offshore platform microgrid control and communication architecture.
Microgrid communication network actually provides a mean for its various elements to
communicate with each other for proper functioning and its integration with main grid station.
Such communication network must fulfill the following requirements: (i) guarantee real time
performance (ii) worst case delay performance (iii) reliable and secure communication to provide
confidentiality and integrity and (iv) access and availability. However, the propagation delay can be
minimized by using high bandwidth communication links but the delays introduced by the control
elements that are the main source of communication messages are out of control of the communication
network. This is because, most of the control elements (voltage regulators, protection relays etc.)
used in microgrid are equipped with low cost and low power processor with very limited memory
to execute tasks. Hence the execution time of these equipment must be considered in designing an
efficient security algorithm to ensure confidentiality and integrity.
From primary, secondary and tertiary controller point of view, primary controller usually performs
operation in milliseconds. Here we need a semi-independent primary controller that takes into account
the commands from secondary controller at a frequency in the range of tens of milliseconds or
more [18]. For example, secondary controller generates a demand response whenever a supply from
renewable energy decreases or energy consumption is increases. Hence secondary controller needs to
operate 5–10 times slower than the primary controller. Power management between the main grid and
microgrids or among the microgrids is controlled by tertiary controllers.
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4. System Model and Attack Model
4.1. System Model
The proposed system model is shown in Figure 3. The meter is considered at front end of the
microgid network. Each micorgrid is assumed to have different owner and has an independent security
features from each other. It means, other mircogrids are considered insecure and lossy in the worst case
condition. Multicast communication approach is considered in the proposed architecture as shown in
Figure 3. For example, sender S is communicating with multiple receivers Ri, (where i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n).
Notations used in this paper are summarized in Table 1.
Microgrid
Network
Insecure and 
Lossy Network
R1
R2
S
R3
Adversary 
Figure 3. Network Model.
Table 1. Notation Table.
Parameters Definition
S, Ri, n sender, i-th receiver, total number of receivers
td Time to deliver a message by the network
tS Sender delay (encryption + signing)
tR Receiver processing delay (decryption + verification)
Kg Group key
KIED Public key
PKIED Private key
Ki-auth Authentication key
tIED Time to execute cycle of IED’s control logic
dmsg Message size in bits
tmax Maximum end to end delay
KMC Key Management center
Nonce Nonce generated by IED (Intelligent Electrical Devices)
End to end communication steps are shown in Figure 4. Here Intelligent Electrical Devices (IEDs)
and controller communicate with each other through User Datagram Protocol over Internet Protocol
stack.(UDP/IP) This is followed as a standard practice in real time systems [19]. This is because
Transmission Control Protocol over Internet Protocol stack (TCP/IP)is not desirable because of its
re-transmission characteristics of loss packets. Sometimes retransmission takes long time and till
then the information might be useless to the receiver. Periodic transmission of data is key factor to
achieve reliability in communication system. Network delay (td) as shown in Figure 4 includes both
propagation delay and transmission delay while tS is the time that a device takes to create a packet
after receiving a message from the application layer. Receiver after receiving the message takes tR
time to process the packet and gives it to the application layer at the receiving device. tmax is the
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maximum end-to-end delay for all possible recipients. However, for successful transmission, tmax
must be greater than tS + td + tR. Based on this assumption, if the message is received after tmax,
it will be discarded. The optimal value of tmax is calculated in such a way to keep the operation of
microgrid power control in stable condition. There are many factors that influence end-to-end delays.
For example, communication links quality, operating systems, execution time of applications, IED’s
hardware computation capabilities, and network architecture.
IED Application
Data Packet + Timestamp
Data Packet Sign and Encrypt
UDP/IP
IED Application
Check Packet Timestamp
Data Packet Decrypt and Verify
UDP/IP
S R
Network delay td
tS tR
Figure 4. End to end communication model within microgrid.
In the proposed model, we have divided the messages into three different types i.e., (1) data
messages that carry actual sensed data (2) safety messages that carry the emergency operations related
data (e.g., shutting down the circuits to protect the system from damage) and (3) control messages that
controls and sets the power plant network operational profile. For our data modeling, we are using
control messages as these are more critical and time sensitive messages.
It is also considered that all IEDs are working in safe mode to protect the system. In the proposed
algorithm, the Key Management Center (KMC) is considered as a centralized trusted third party
that helps in the authentication and key establishment process among the devices belonging to
different microgrids.
4.2. Attack Model
The attack model in this paper consists of an adversary that has the following capabilities.
• It has full access to microgrid network communication.
• It can eavesdrop, capture, replay, drop, delay and modify packets.
With these capabilities, an adversary can easily modify the packet contents and inject fake packets.
Adversary can also eavesdrop, intercept, drop or delay packets easily or analyze packets passively to
get information from the intercepted packets.
5. Security Algorithm
The motivation behind the proposed security architecture is to enable the entities/devices in
microgrids to authenticate each other and communicate securely. Also the algorithm must be resilient to
the impersonation attacks, man in the middle attacks and replay attacks. To this aim, each entity/device
needs to decrypt and verify the messages within the maximum time period i.e., tmax. Similarly if
adversary inject some malicious or fake data, the devices must be able to recognize and discard it.
In the proposed architecture, we also assume an independent and standalone Key Management Center
(KMC). The proposed key generation algorithm is based on Elgamal Elliptic Curve Cryptography.
This approach uses a key of length 130–160 bits. It does not require to share a common key like in
symmetric key approach.
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5.1. Key Pre-Distribution
Each IED is given an initial one time authentication key Ki-auth during the manufacturing process
by the company. Once the IED is installed in microgrid architecture, it sends a join request to KMC.
This join request is encrypted with Ki-auth. The KMC contacts the IED’s Manufacturing Company
(IMC) through secure link (secured by public key infrastructure approach) and requests for the IED’s
authentication key Ki-auth. The IED’s manufacturing company sends the encrypted version of Ki-auth
using the KMC public key and signed by its own private key. This ensures the authenticity and
integrity of the received Ki-auth.
IED→ KMC : {IED, Nonce}Ki-auth (1)
KMC→ IMC : {Req.Ki-auth}KIMC (2)
IMC→ KMC : {Ki-auth}KKMC ||H{Ki-auth} (3)
where KIMC and KKMC are the public keys of IMC and KMC respectively.
After receiving Ki-auth, KMC decrypts the join request containing a Nonce. KMC increments the
received Nonce, encrypts it using Ki-auth and sends it back to the IED along with the elliptic curve
parameters EP(a, b), KMC public key and list of other IEDs installed.
KMC→ IED : {Nonce + 1}Ki-auth ||EP(a, b)
||KKMC||IED’s IDs
(4)
As the IED receives an incremented Nonce and verified successfully by Ki-auth, it generates its
own public/private key pair (KIED/PKIED) based on the received elliptic curve information and sends
its public key back to KMC for registration, signed by Ki-auth. KMC registers public keys of all the IEDs
after verification.
IED→ KMC : KIED || HKi-auth(KIED) (5)
In order to communicate with other IEDs in the network, IEDisends a request to KMC for the
public key of IEDj. KMC sends the public key of IEDj to IEDi signed by its own private key for the
authentication purpose.
IEDi → KMC : Request KIEDj (6)
KMC→ IEDi : KIEDj || HPKKMC(KIEDj) (7)
where PKKMC is the private counter part of KKMC and is only known to KMC.
5.2. Key Generation Procedure
This section describes the details of public and private key generation using elliptic curve
cryptography as shown in Algorithm 1. Before starting to generate a public/private key pair,
an KMC/IED selects an elliptic curve EP(a, b). KMC/IED then chooses a point on this elliptic curve
i.e., E1 and a random number R. This random number R acts as a private key and it describes that
how many times E1 must be added with itself to generate E2. KMC/IED keeps R secret as its private
key and announces E1, E2 and P as public key to other devices.
Algorithm 1 Key Generation
Select an elliptic curve EP(a, b)
Select a point E1 on EP(a, b)
Select a private key d
Calculate E2 = RE1
Keep d secret as private key
Make ( E1 , E2, EP(a, b)) public
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5.3. Secure Communication
In the proposed communication protocol, we first encrypt the message and then generate its hash
(i.e., MAC). This approach helps the receiver to verify the message first and then decrypt. If receiver
receives a fake message, it will not be able to verify the message and hence receiver will not try to
decrypt it. This reduces the unnecessary decryption and save the resource of devices.
5.3.1. Unicast Communication
The proposed one-to-one secure communication model works as follow:
• For an IEDi to communicate with other IEDj, it requests the public key of IEDj from the KMC as
shown in Equations (6) and (7).
• IEDi encrypts the message (M) using its own private key (Ri) and public key of IEDj (Ej1, Ej2, EP)
as follow:
C1 = RiEj1 (8)
C2 = M + RiEj2 (9)
C1 and C2 are the two cipher texts generated for the message M.
• Once the message is encrypted, IEDi generates a MAC from the encrypted message and signs it
with its own private key as.
MAC = {H(C1 + C2)}Ri (10)
where H is a hashing function used to generate a hash that acts as a message authentication
code MAC.
• IEDi sends C1, C2 and MAC to IEDj
IEDi → IEDj : [C1 || C2 ||MAC] (11)
• IEDj creates MAC’ from the received message using the same hashing function H and compares it
with the received decrypted MAC as
MAC’ = H(C1 + C2) (12)
MAC = {H(C1 + C2)PKIEDi }KIEDi = H(C1 + C2) (13)
• If the received decrypted MAC is equal to the new calculated MAC’, it accepts the message and
decrypts the entire message as
M = C2 − (Rj × C1) (14)
M = M + RiEj2 − (Rj × RiEj1) (15)
M = M + RiRjEj1 − RjRiEj1 (16)
M = M (17)
otherwise it discards the messages.
There is also a possibility that an IED communicates with other IED of other networks. This
usually happens if there are two circuit breakers installed at both ends of a long power line. These two
IEDs might belongs to two different networks. In this scenario, an IED gets the public key of other
networks IED through its own KMC. KMC of one network IED contacts with KMC of other network
IED to get the public key of that IED.
5.3.2. Broadcast and Multicast Communication
Sometimes IEDs need to broadcast or multicast a message. More specifically, IEDs do broadcasting
or multicasting in an emergency scenarios in order to let other IEDs to either shutdown or brake
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circuits. To this aim, an broadcast or multicast authentication and encryption key, called group key
Kg, is generated by KMC for its member IEDs and distributed among those IEDs. This means that Kg
is only valid for those IEDs that are part of KMC and are not known to those IEDs that belongs to
other KMCs.
6. Evaluation
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme, it is compared with some well
known algorithms i.e., RSA-based Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)
and Time Valid Hash to Obtain Random Subsets (TV-HORS).
6.1. Key Length
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm, time is considered one of the
most important parameter. Table 2 shows the time consumption comparison of different algorithms
using a 600 MHz microprocessor. The key lifetime is limited to 248 according the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) recommendations. The proposed security scheme is based on
elliptic curve crytography approach used for both (1) authentication and (2) secure communication.
Table 2. Security Algorithm Time Performance Statistics.
OpenSSL Performance Statistics for VIA Eden 600 MHz
Microgrid message payload (dmsg) [17] 42 bytes
Time for 160-ECC encryption/decryption 0.007 ms
Time for 192-AES encryption/decryption 0.008 ms
Time for 192-AES CMAC auth. tag 0.008 ms
Time for SHA-256 digest 0.007 ms
Time for RSA-2048 signature 312.5 ms
Time for RSA-2048 signature verification 9.1 ms
Time for DSA signature 91.7 ms
Time for DSA signature verification 111.1 ms
In the proposed algorithm, the key size to achieve the required minimum key lifetime is 160 bits
while we need a key of size 2014-bits in case of RSA PKI, 256-bit for DSA. The OTS protocol used for
comparison is TV-HORS. This has much better performance than the other OTS algorithms [20]. For the
required minimum key lifetime, at least 500 KBytes of key length is required for TV-HORS [13]. Each
primary controller in offshore microgrid sends a message at every 80 ms. Hence a total of 13 messages
send per second. The minimum time required to bootstrap a key in TV-HORS approach is 120 s which
makes the lifetime of key equals to 840 s. Each IED is need to refresh its key after every 840 s (14 min).
However, bootstrapping a new key takes 120 s (2 min) and this solution is not practically feasible.
6.2. Theoretical Analysis
Although there is no standard benchmark for tmax, we assumed it to be 3 ms according to
IEC 61850. Table 3 presents the comparative analysis in terms of key size and total number of keys
stored. In the proposed scheme, if there are n IEDs in the network, each one stores only Ki-auth,
KIED/PKIED and Kg keys while [7] needs to store kc, two KS keys, and 2(n− 1) session secret keys and
thus have a high communication overhead specially in the broadcast scenario. In order to calculate
the packetization delay tS, we considered only the encryption and authentication process while tR
is the time to verify the messages at the receiver. Since TV-HORS does precomputation, its delay is
minimum than the RSA and DSA. Normally packetization and verification time in RSA and DSA
exceed 3 ms which is the standard end to end delay in microgrid communication. Therefore RSA-based
PKI approaches are not considered suitable for microgrid communication. Communication overhead
of the RSA scheme is 2048 bits per message.
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Table 3. Comparative Analysis of Microgrid Security Algorithms.
Security Algorithm Storage per IED tS (ms) tR (ms) Packet Size (bits) Max. Ri Clock Sync Required
Proposed 4× 160 bits ≈ n× 0.007 ≈ 0.014 dmsg + 160 Unlimited No
Reference [7] (3+ (2n− 1))× 192 bits ≈ n× 0.008 ≈ 0.016 dmsg + (n− 1)× 96 >300 No
RSA 2048 bits ≈ 312.5 ≈ 9.1 dmsg + 2048 0 No
DSA 256 bits ≈ 91.7 ≈ 111.1 dmsg + 160 0 No
TV-HORS >500 KB ≈ 0.0015 ≈ 0.0015 dmsg + 11.256 Unlimited Yes
Figure 2 represents a communication network connecting IEDs with each other and it has Key
Management Center (KMC), circuit breaker controls, DC/DC converters, DC generator and voltage
regulator, 10 primary controllers, secondary controllers and tertiary controllers. This communication
network consists of less than 50 IEDs. tIED represents the time consumed by IED application, tpri is the
time taken by primary controller, tsec is the time taken by secondary controller, tter is the time taken
by tertiary controller, tconv is DC/DC conversion time and treg is the time consumed by the voltage
regulators. The execution time of the control loop is the total time duration between the sensing
event (performed by sensing IED) and action event (performed by action IED). In this paper, we only
consider the execution time of the primary-secondary control loop and tertiary-secondary control loop.
Within the microgrid communication network, IEDs are connected to each other through a link having
a capacity of (0.1–10 Gb/s) while IEDs data generation rate is (10–100 kb/s). Hence there will be no
congestion over the microgrid communication network. Intermediate routers and switches delay is
ignored in this work.
6.2.1. Primary-Secondary Control Loop
The job of the primary controller is to measure the speed and torque of a motor and provides
this information to secondary controller after every tpri seconds. Upon receiving this information,
secondary controller calculates duty cycle for each DC/DC converter. In this way, power to the
machines is controlled. The total time consumed in measuring the speed and torque and then taking
appropriate action for power adjustment is known as the delay of primary-secondary control loop
Tpri-sec. It is shown in Figure 5. Normally, primary controller and DC/DC converters operate in parallel
but secondary controller waits to receive all the data before taking any action. Hence an additional
delay of npri × tR occurs due to npri number of primary controllers. Therefore, the delay Tpri-sec of
primary-secondary control loop is
Tpri-sec = tpri + tsec + tconv + 2× tS + 2× td + (npri + 1)× tR. (18)
Figure 5. Microgrid’s primary and secondary distribution control loop.
For example, if the bandwidth of the communication link is 100 Mbps and using Table 2,
approximate propagation delay td is 0.04 ms. From the literature, tsec is set to 500 ms, tconv is set
to 500 ms [6], and tpri is set to 80 ms [18]. Final control loop delay for security purpose of the
proposed algorithm is 1070 ms. While the CMAC-192-based approach has a delay of around 1080 ms,
the RSA-based approach has a delay of 1805 ms and DSA has a total delay of around 2485 ms.
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6.2.2. Tertiary-Secondary Control Loop
The tertiary-secondary control loop delay is also calculated in the same way as described above.
The total delay is represented as:
Tter-sec = tter + tsec + tconv + 2× tS + 2× td + 2× tR (19)
In case of the broadcast scenario, total delay of the proposed algorithm is 1460 ms while
CMAC-based approach has a delay of 1570 ms, RSA has a delay of 2144 ms.
6.3. Simulation Setup and Results
The simulation environment to evaluate the performance of the proposed microgrid architecture
consists of MATLAB (Version 8, Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA) and OMNeT++ (Version 4.1,
OpenSim Ltd., Stanford, CA, USA). Communication network simulation is performed in OMNeT++
simulator while power system is evaluated using MATLAB [16]. User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
protocol is used as transport layer protocol to avoid handshake delay and retransmission delay and
used 100 Mbps Ethernet links for connection. Custom adaptive scheduler is used for interfacing two
simulators. Since the two simulators interact with each other based on the action and decision of
each controller, scheduler take care of the speed, execution time and event handler to synchronize the
operation of two simulators.
For the attack scenarios, all the communication among IEDs is made available to the attackers
and the attacker device is made to accept all the traffic within the network. In this way, the attacker has
access to all the public parameters and messages shared among different IEDs through wireless channel.
To implement, man in the middle attack, the attacker device is made a first hop neighbor of sending IED
while all other receiving IEDs are made second hop neighbors of sending IEDs. The attacking device
changes the content of the message while it does not drop the message. This is because communication
is UDP-based and messages normally follow more than one path so dropping of messages by attacker
is ignored in this simulation.
The results are obtained by varying the total number of receivers in a multicast environment.
In each scenario, induction motors and primary controller start with the interval of 1 s. In order to
rectify the disturbance introduce by the induction motor, secondary controllers send duty cycle to DC
converters. Once microgrid comes in full running sate, it does the transition from island mode to the
grid connected mode.
Primary-secondary control loop delay is observed when all the IEDs were active. Table 4 shows
the maximum observed primary-secondary control loop delay. The difference between the theoretical
delay and simulation delay is due to the intermediate nodes of the simulation environment and also
because of fact that secondary controller emits action only when it receives all the information from
all primary controllers. The proposed solution is also compared with the CMAC, RSA and DSA
approaches that have higher delays. Moreover, RSA and DSA have also stability issues in power
system because of their large delay. TV-HORS is not considered as it has a very long key bootstrap
time and results in unstable behavior of power system as well.
Table 4. Maximum Distributed Control Loop Delay.
Protocol Distributed Control Loop Delay [Theoretical/Simulation]
Proposed ECC Based 1070/1099.5 ms
CMAC-192, CMAC-96 1080/1128.5 ms
RSA 1805/2093.7 ms
DSA 2485/4424.3 ms
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6.4. Man in the Middle Attack (MMA)
The Man in the Middle Attack (MMA) is one the dangerous attacks that is very difficult to detect
in a normal scenario. In this attack, an attacker comes in the middle between sender (S) and receiver
(R) if both S and R are not in the radio coverage range of each other. Attacker impersonates itself as R
for S and S for R without being detected. In this way, attacker can modify, read or inject fake packets.
In the simulation of the proposed scheme, a malicious node acts as man-in-the-middle is
introduced in such a way that all the messages exchange between the S and R passes through this
node. The features of malicious node are (1) store each message for future use and (2) corrupt message
by replacing the message payload without changing the header. As S and R have been assigned Kauth,
it is used to encrypt and sign the join message that passes through the malicious node. Malicious node
changes the payload of the message. As malicious node does not have Kauth, it cannot encrypt the new
payload and cannot replace the signature. When the destination receives the message, it decrypts it
using Kauth, generates signature (hash) from the decrypted message and compare it with the received
signature. As the received signature does not match the geneated signature of the message, receiver
discard the message because of message corruption. It also gives an indication to the receiver that
there is man-in-the-middle attack.
During the normal operation, each device signs the messages using its private key. Malicious
node does not know the private key of every other node of the network. Hence malicious node cannot
replace the signature or modify the message as it is easily detected at the receiving side.
6.5. Replay Attacks
As explained above, malicious node is given the capability to store the received messages, it can
also replay the captured packets after some time to disrupt the proper functionality of microgrid. In the
proposed architecture, we stamps each message with a timestamp as shown in Figure 4. This helps
the receiver to differentiate between the new message and an old replayed message. This is because,
if the message is received after tmax, it is discarded by the receiver. In this way, proposed security
architecture works well against the replay attacks.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, a secure authentication and key establishment algorithm is proposed for microgrid
architecture that is less computationally expensive and supports the microgrid communication
environment without disturbing its operation. The proposed model is based on a modified version of
Elgamal that improved the cipher text authenticity as well as achieved the non repudiation property.
In terms of time, the proposed solution performed better than the existing key establishment algorithms.
The simulation results using OMNeT++ ensured the security of the proposed algorithm against man in
the middle attacks and replay attacks. The analytical and simulation results showed the effectiveness
of the proposed algorithm over the existing state of the art algorithms in terms of speed, memory
consumption and computational power.
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